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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
F,EDERATED SE·CURITY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Apellant, 
vs. 
ISAAC ORSE,N BURTON, aka Orsen 
Burton; and HORACE J. 
KNOWLTON, 





STATE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action now involves only a counterclaim by 
defendant Horace J. Knowlton. The appeal involves 
plaintiff's right to a dis1nissal of the counterclaim under 
Rule 37(b}(~) (iii), U.R.C.P., and, necessarily, the ques-
tions whether, after entering an order of dislnissal, the 
district court acted properly (1) in considering a plead-
ing filed by defendant Knowlton after the entry of the 
dismissal; ( 2) in treating the pleading as a motion for 
nt=-w trial: and (3) in setting aside its order of dis-
missal. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The district court dismissed defendant Knowlton's 
counterclaim for his failure to comply with an order 
compelling discovery under Rule 37(a), U.R.C.P. De-
fendant Knowlton thereafter filed a pleading styled 
"Objections to Order of Dismissal" on which the district 
court held a hearing and considered as a motion for new 
trial under Rule 59, U.R.C.P. The district court denied 
plaintiff's motion of strike the pleading and thereafter 
set aside its order of dismissal. 
RELIE.F SOUGIIT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the district 
court denying plaintiff's motion to strike and setting 
aside the order of dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts giving rise to this appeal are rather in-
volved. For purposes of clarity the parties will be 
referred to as they appeared in the district court. Plain-
tiff brought an action against defendants Isaac Orsen 
Burton and Horace J. Knowlton to determine disputed 
ownership of a certain certificate representing shares 
of plaintiff's common capital stock. Defendant Knowlton 
filed a counterclaim alleging that certain commissions 
were due him from plaintiff for sales of insurance poli-
cies and sales of stock, and alleging plaintiff made certain 
improper charges against his account. On November 
9, 1962, consideration of the complaint and the counter-
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elaim of <.lPfendant l(nowlton were separated by the 
eourt, and on N ove1nber 13, 1962, summary judgment 
was entered ruling that defendant Burton had no claim 
agai11st plaintiff for issuance of its stock and dismissing 
plaintiff's complaint against defendant Knowlton. (R. 
30). This left as the only matter for disposition in the 
ease the counterclaim of defendant Knowlton. The term 
"defPndant" will hereafter be used to describe only the 
d(-t'end.ant l{nowlton. 
Pursuant to Rule 33, U.R.C.P., plaintiff served in-
tPrrogatories upon defendant on June 13, 1962. (R. 1, 2,). 
These interrogatories sought information as to the details 
and basis of defendant's claim in order to enable plaintiff 
to prepare a defense. On October 17, 1962, defendant 
Knowlton served purported answers to the interrog-
atorit'S which failed to contain the information asked 
for by plaintiff. (R. 3, 4). Defendant claimed the infor-
mation regarding his claim was all in plaintiff's exclu-
::;iye possession. Thereafter on April18, 1962 defendant 
filed supplen1t>ntal answers to plaintiff's interrogatories 
whieh. although 14 pages long, still failed to provide the 
information sought by plaintiff in its interrogatories. 
(R. 3-18). These supplemental answers were vague 
as to subject matter and, as an example, contained the 
names of 413 families and made reference to a list of 
SL'Yeral hundred more. (R. 7-12, 17). However, they 
failed to adequately state the basis and details of defend-
anfs claim as to the families listed. 
Because of the evasiveness and insufficiency of the 
answers plaintiff 'Yas unable to prepare its defense, and 
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moved the court for an order under Rule 37(a), U.R.C.P. 
requiring defendant to make discovery by providing the 
information sought in plaintiff's interrogatories. (R. 19). 
The court held seven or eight hearings to determine what 
information defendant fairly had available to him and 
what information he should be required to produce to 
satisfy plaintiff's interrogatories. (R. 30). As a result 
of these hearings the court found that the defendant had 
substantially all of the information sought by plaintiff 
through statements which had been provided monthly by 
plaintiff and other information available to him. (R. 31). 
However, to fully explore the question the court ordered 
plaintiff to produce evidence on a sampling of the items 
claimed by defendant to determine whether, under all 
of the circumstances, defendant should be required to 
make full and complete discovery. The court found that: 
"A sampling of items relied upon by defend-
ant and portrayed to the court by answers under 
oath by plaintiff indicated to the court that de-
fendant, by his counter-claim, was on a fishing 
trip, only, at plaintiff's expense." (R. 31). 
Nevertheless the court permitted defendant to select one 
item under his claim which he felt showed the greatest 
possible merit. The court on that point found: 
"Defendant, thereupon, selected an item of 
$.6,180.00, represented by a check and set out as 
No.(1) in plaintiff's Answers of April 18, 1963. 
The court then required plaintiff to submit and 
portray by evidence the complete accounting of 
all transactions relating to this item. Mter day's 
hearing relative thereto, with evidence upon the 
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books and reeords of plaintiff company, defendant 
withdrew his claiin admitting that he had no 
claim, whatever, based upon said check." (R. 31). 
After nunwrous hearings, the court on July 26, 1963 
enti•n·d an order pursuant to Rule 37 (a), U.R.C.P., under 
which it ordered the defendant to provide plaintiff with 
the following infonnation relating to his claim on or 
bi•t'ore August 2~, 19G3: 
Hl. Copes of the contracts with plaintiff 
upon which he relies in asserting his Counter 
Clai1n, including the schedules of cominissions on 
eaeh such contract. 
2. The policy numbers for each policy for 
which he 1nakes claim, and if he cannot designate 
said policy nun1bers then the name of the insured 
and the date upon which said policy was issued 
for which he makes claiin. 
3. The nature, basis and amount of his claim 
with regard to each specific policy and the date 
upon which each claim originally arose. 
±. A designation as to each policy for which 
clain1 is made of the contract and commission 
schedule under which claim is made." (R. 19·, 20). 
Defendant failed to provide plaintiff with the infor-
mation indicated in the court's order, and on August 
~ti. 19G3, plaintiff filed a n1otion to dismiss defendant's 
eounterclailn pursuant to Rule 37 (b) and Rule 41 (b) and 
(c), F.R.C.P. On September 6, 19·63, defendant filed 
"Defendant's ~-\.nswer in Response to Order," but except 
for answer X o. 1 the Answers failed to provide the in-
formation required by the order. (R. 22, 23). 
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The court held a hearing on plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss the counterclaim of defendant Knowlton for fail-
ure to comply with Rule 37, U.R.C.P., and on November 
12, 19·6.3, the court entered its memorandum decision con-
cluding that the counterclaim of defendant Knowlton 
should be dismissed under Rule 37(b) (2}(iii), U.R.C.P. 
(R. 30, 31, 32). 
Pursuant to the memorandum decision the order of 
dismissal was entered November 14, 1963, dis1nissing 
with prejudice the defendant's counterclaim. (R. 33). On 
November 25, 19·63, defendant Knowlton filed a pleading 
titled "Defendant's Objections to Order of Dismissal." 
(R. 34, 35). The substance of ''Defendant's Objections to 
Order of Dismissal'' constitutes a repetition of certain 
specific and some general claims defendant set forth in 
his counterclaim. On December 12, 196·3, plaintiff filed 
a Motion to Strike "Defendant's Objections to Order of 
Dismissal." (R. 36, 37). Hearing was held on "Defend-
ant's Objections to Order of Disnrissal" and plaintiff's 
motion to strike, and thereafter on ~,1arch 20, 1964, the 
court, treating the pleading as a motion for a new trial, 
entered its supplemental 1nemorandum decision setting 
aside the order of disnrissal and denying plaintiff's mo-




THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION TO STRIKE "DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL" SINCE THE PLEADING ENTITLED "DE-
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F'ENDANT'S OBJECTION TO ORDER OF DISMISSAL" IS 
BEYOND THE SCOPE PERMITTED BY UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
The court erred in denying plaintiff's Motion to 
Strike defendant's pleading entitled "Defendant's Ob-
jPdion to Order of Disn1issal." Since such pleading in 
titlf', fonn and substance (R.. 3'±, 35) is beyond the scope 
pertnittt>d by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
could not properly be considered by the court. 
Rule 7(b) (1), U.R.C.P., provides: 
":Motions. An application to the court for 
an order shall be made by motion which, unless 
n1adP during a hearing or trial, shall be made 
in writing, shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief 
or order sought. The requirement of writing is 
fulfilled if the motion is stated in written notice 
of the hearing of the motion." 
The pleading which the defendant entitled "D·efendant's 
ObjPetions to Order of Dismissal" fails to fulfill any of 
the requirements of Rule 7(b) (1). The court regarded 
the pleading as a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, 
U.R.C.P., (R. 38). However, such a motion is subject 
to the requiren1ents of Rule 7(b) (1), and an examination 
of the pleading (R. 34, 35) and an application of its 
~ubstance to the requirement to Rule 7 (b) (1) clearly 
show that the pleading can not be construed a motion in 
any 1nanner and its form is not that required by a motion. 
The substance of the pleading fails to state with particu-
larity the grounds therefore and fails to set forth the 
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relief (')r order sought as required by Rule 7 (b), U.R.C.P. 
Although the Rules of Procedure are liberally construed 
by the court to permit the substance of a pleading to 
prevail over the form, to constitute a motion the pleading 
must set forth the grounds on which its rests and the 
relief or order sought. The pleading is so vague and 
uncertain in its substance it cannot be said to set forth 
grounds supporting a motion. Further, in no place 
or manner does the pleading state the relief or order 
sought. 
In the case of Howard v. Howard, 11 U. (2d) 149, 
356 P.2d 275, the Supreme Court applied the rule of 
liberal construction to a pleading claimed to be motion 
for a new trial. Even under the holding of the H award 
case the "Defendant's Objections to Order. of Dismissal" 
cannot be brought within the purvue of Rule 7(b) (1). 
In that case the pleading was denominated a notice of 
intention to file a motion for a new trial, but the court 
pointed out that in the body of the pleading it was termed 
"Motion." The pleading in that case clearly showed the 
relief or order sought and the grounds therefore. Fur-
ther, the pleading met the requirements of Rule 59(a), 
U.R.C.P., in that it set forth the grounds required by 
subparagraph (1) of Rule 59(a) U.R.C.P., supported 
by an attached affidavit, as required by Rule 59(c), 
U.R.C.P., and stated the ground provided in subpara-
graph (7) of Rule 59(a), U.R.C.P. The court found that 
pleading in substance requested a new trial. However, 
the defendant's pleading in the instant case does not 
meet any of the requirements of Rule 7(h) (1), U.R.C.P. 
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or Rule 5D, lT.R.C.P. as set forth in the Rules and as con-
~t nwd in thP II oward decision. 
SirwP tlwn• is no other Rule under which defendant's 
plPading, ''DefPndant's Objections to Order of Dismissal" 
could corne before the court for consideration it is clear 
that the pleading is beyond the scope permitted by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the trial court erred 
in considPring it at all. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN TREATING DEFENDANT'S 
PLEADING "DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL" AS A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNDER 
RULE 59, U.R.C.P., AND FURTHER ERRED IN SETTING 
ASIDE THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL THROUGH ITS SUP-
PLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM DECISION WHICH IN EF-
FECT GRANTED DEFENDANT A TRIAL IMPROPERLY 
UNDER THE GUISE OF RULE 59, U.R.C.P. 
Under Rule 7(b) (1), U.R.C.P., it is clear the "D·e-
fendant's Objections to Order of Dismissal" is not a mo-
tion and therefore the court erred in treating it as a 
motion for a new trial. Further, under Rule 59·( a), U.R. 
C.P .. a motion for a new trial must be based upon cer-
tain grounds set forth therein. None of these grounds 
nrp stated in defendant's pleading and cannot, in the 
total absence of such grounds, be read into the pleading 
by the court. 
The effect of the decision is to grant defendant a 
trial without any justification under or basis in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Obviously, since defendant 
had not had a trial he is not entitled to move for a new 
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trial. ·The action was dismissed for failure to make dis-
covery and defendant had a remedy by appeal which 
he failed to pursue. The court cannot act for hiin except 
as provided in the Rules of Procedure. The court here 
did not undertake to act on its own motion under the 
Rules and improperly granted defendant relief under 
Rule 5H, U.R.C.P. which he had not lawfully petitioned 
for. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL SINCE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DIS-
MISSAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT UN-
DER RULE 37(b)(2)(iii), U.R.C.P., AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The district court found that the "Defendant's Ans-
wers in Response to Order" filed September 6, 1963, did 
not provide the information required by the Order dated 
July 26, 19,63, under Rule 37, U.R.C.P. (R. 19, 20), and 
defendant failed to challenge the court's finding that he 
refused to make discovery. 
Rule 37(b), U.R.C.P. deals with the consequences of 
refusal to make discovery, and with respect to interroga-
tories served under Rule 33, U.R.C.P. provides: 
" ... Upon refusal of a party to answer any 
interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, the 
proponent of the question may on like notice make 
application for [an Order compelling an answer]." 
For failure to comply with an Order compelling an ans-
wer Rule 37(b) (2) (iii), U.R.C.P., provides that the court 
1nay dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof. 
The proper procedure was followed in the instant case. 
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J•.taint i I' I' ~Prv<'d interrogatories under Rule 33, U.R.C.P., 
and dt.fendant's answers failed to provide the informa-
tion calh,d for by the interrogatories. Upon defendant's 
l'ailurp to provide the inforn1ation, plaintiff applied to 
tlw eonrt for an Order under Rule 37(a), U.R.C.P., which 
wa~ issued. Upon defendant's failure to comply with 
that order, and after a number of hearings and much 
dt>liberation, the court granted an order dismissing the 
count<>rclaim. 
\Yhile there are no Utah cases construing Rule 
:>7 (h) (2) (iii), U.R.C.P., the Rule is taken directly from 
the fedPral rulP \Yhich has been construed many times. 
In a decision in which the facts are closely analagous to 
the instant case, JJlichigan vVindow Cleaning Company v. 
Jlarti11o, et al, 173 F.2d 466 (C.A. 6th Cir), the plaintiff 
fi lt>d an action for da1nages and served interrogatories on 
the deft>ndant. The defendant failed to answer and plain-
tiff obtained an order from the court requiring defendant 
to provide answers to the interrogatories. The answers 
made by the defendant were not responsive to the ques-
tions and the court then granted additional time. After 
furtlwr delays, under Rule 37, default was entered 
against defendant for his failure to respond to interrog-
atoriPs. The court of appeals affirmed the default and 
the judgment rendered pursuant thereto, and pointed 
out that the defendant had adequate opportunity to 
pn,s.ent the required information. The court further 
said that defendant's failure to make any attempt to give 
adequate and cmnplete answers to the interrogatories left 
it ,,·ith no alternative but to enter the order of default. 
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Concerning the rights to discovery under Rule 33 the 
court said: 
" . [Rule 33] is to be accorded a broad and 
liberal treatment, for civil trials in the federal 
courts no longer need to be carried on in the dark. 
* * * * * * 
"Much has been left to the discretion of the court, 
and in view of the appellant's dilatory and con-
tumacious tactics we are not pursuaded that the 
discretion has been abused." 
In Milewski v. Schneider Transportation Company, 
238 F.2d 39'1 (C.A. Gth Cir.), the plaintiff brought an 
action to recover for injuries. Defendant served inter-
rogatories on November 19, 19'54. Extention for answer-
ing was stipulated by the parties setting, in succession, 
December 23, 19'64, March 8, 1955 and June 7, 19'55 for 
the filing of answers. Plaintiff failed to answer and 
defendant moved for judgment under Rule 37 (d), Fed-
eral Rules of Procedure. The district court entered an 
order of dismissal which was affirmed on appeal. The 
court of appeals said: 
"It appearing that the entry of the order was 
authorized under Rule 37 (d), Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 28 U.S.C.A., and the court being of the 
opinion that the District Judge did not abuse 
his discretion in doing so (citing cases). The 
Judgment is affirmed." 
Similarly in Interstate Cigar Company v. Consoli-
aated Cigar Company, 317 F.2d 744, (C.A. 2nd Cir.), the 
plaintiff filed suit and defendant started taking the 
deposition of one Spielfogel, a member of plaintiff part-
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nership. II P refused to answer a nmnber of questions 
and dt'l'(mdant movP<l for an order compelling answers 
undl'r Hule 37 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
rrhe court ordered Spielfogel to answer the questions, 
hut he f'ai IP<l to appear at the time and place set for his 
dPpo~ i tion. Thereafter the defendant moved to dismiss. 
Tlw di~trid court dismissed the complaint, and on appeal 
the ein·uit court affirmed the decision and said: 
"It is too clear for doubt, we believe, that at 
least some of the questions Spielfogel was direc-
ted to answer were 'relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action.'" 
In tlw instant case the question of whether a.n order 
of dismis~al under Rule 37, U.R.C.P., should have been 
grantPd in the first instance was within the discretion of 
tlw district court. However, upon its entry, relief from 
the order could onl~, be obtained in the Inanner provided 
hy the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The file reflects 
tlw defendant's refusal to provide plaintiff with direct 
answers and his repeated evasions. The court afforded 
defendant adequate opportunity to provide responsive 
nn~wers to both plaintiff's interrogatories and the ques-
tions which the court ordered defendant to answer under 
Rule ~i7(a), U.R.C.P. In its memorandum decision the 
court noted that it had held numerous hearings to deter-
mine the propriety of the disocvery procedures sought by 
plaintiff in the case. (R. 30, 31, 32). The court further 
noted that plaintiff was required to produce evidence 
disproYing numerous items involved in defendant's 
eounterclain1, including evidence taken throughout a full 
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day's hearing on the single item defendant claimed had 
had the greatest possible merit. The court concluded 
that the information was available to defendant, that his 
claim was without merit and determined that defendant's 
counterclaim should be dismissed under Rule 37 (b) (2) 
(iii), U.R.C.P. for defendant's refusal to make discovery. 
Thereafter the court signed and entered the order of 
dismissal. The file reflects no new or other material 
which would challenge or contradict the court's basis 
for granting the order of dismissal as shown in its 
memorandum decision, although defendant had adequate 
opportunity to present any matters he desired. The 
defendant merely filed a pleading entitled "Defendant's 
Objection to Order of Dismissal." An order of dismissal 
under Rule 37 (b) (2) (iii), U.R.C.P., is a final judgment 
and is subject to appellate review, and defendant's 
remedy was properly a direct appeal from that order. 
See 4 Moore, Federal Practice, Section 26.37. There is 
no . basis in the record or in law for the action of the 
district court in setting aside the order of dismissal and 
denying plaintiff's motion to strike "Defendant's Objec-
tion to Order of Dismissal." The supplementary memor-
andum decision entered by the court recites no facts 
or basis on which its previous order of dismissal could 
be set aside. 
CONCL·USION 
The decision of the district court setting aside the 
order of dismissal and denying plaintiff's motion to 
strike should be reversed since under the facts as found 
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by the court and applicable law, "Defendant's Objection 
to Ord('I' of Dismissal" should not have been heard by the 
(•ourt since it is beyond the scope of pleadings permitted 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court further 
('tTed when it considered "Defendant's Objection to Order 
of Dismissal' as a motion for a new trial and based its 
:-;('tting aside of the order of dismissal on the ground that 
a motion for a new trial should be granted. Further, 
plaintiff is entitled to a dismissal as ordered by the court 
undt>r Hule 37(b) (2) (iii), U.R.C.P., and no basis existed 
in law or in fact for the action of the district court in 
entering a supplementary memorandum decision setting 
a:-; i.de the order of dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN F. PIERCEY 
901 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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